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The Failure of the First Income Tax: A Tale of Commercial Tax Evaders? 
 
Abstract: This article constitutes a re-examination of the financial failure of the first income 
tax in Britain, introduced in 1799 in order to address the rising cost of the French revolutionary 
wars. In accounting for this failure, the existing literature has focused largely on failings in the 
administration of the tax, often blaming, for example, its emphasis on local responsibility for 
tax collection, and its reliance on the honesty of its contributors. This article furthers these 
interpretations by highlighting that such issues were particularly problematic in their 
application to the commercial sector of society. It argues that the preferential treatment of 
commercial interests in the substance of the tax, on account of their privileged position in the 
political sphere, led to the establishment of a culture of commercial evasion. The evidence for 
this is examined at length, through both detailed analysis of the yield of the tax, as well as the 
attitudes of contemporaries evident in the literature at the time. This analysis ultimately leads 
to the conclusion that commercial evasion of the first tax played a pivotal, and hitherto 
underplayed, role in the financial underperformance of the tax. 
 
Keywords: tax law; income tax; legal history; law with economics 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The first income tax, 1799 to 1802, has thus far attracted relatively little attention from 
historians, at least in comparison to the better-known second tax of 1803±1816. This can be 
explained in part by the fact that until 1939, all records accounting for the administration of the 
tax were believed lost, destroyed by Parliament upon the abolition of the tax in an apparent 
DWWHPSWWRZLSHWKHWD[IURPPHPRU\WKHµEDUHVWDWLVWLFDORXWOLQH¶DOOWKDWUHPDLQHG1 However, 
the discovery by Hope-Jones of duplicates sitting forgotten in the records of WKH NLQJ¶V
remembrancer sparked several detailed analyses of the tax,2 notably by Hope-Jones himself in 
                                                     
1
 Arthur Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic Wars, Cambridge, 1939, 2. 
2
 7KHNLQJ¶VUHPHPEUDQFHUZDVDQRIILFHZLWKLQWKHFRXUWRIWKHH[FKHTXHUWDVNHGSULPDULO\ZLWKWKH
keeping of records relating to taxation. 
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1939,3 subsequently by Farnsworth in 1951,4 and also by Sabine in 1966.5 These studies, 
alongside notable contributions from modern commentators such as Chantal Stebbings and 
John F. Avery Jones,6 have painted a picture of the first tax as the birth of a promising fiscal 
instrument, but blighted by administrative weaknesses such that its failure was inevitable. 
There is no doubt that general administrative failings ± such as the lack of a strong centralized 
system of collection ± did play a significant part in accounting for the poor yield, and such 
failings will be considered in this article in due course. However, this focus has led to the 
neglect of a central explanation for the financial underperformance of the tax, namely the 
exceptionally poor revenue taken IURPµFRPPHUFLDOLQFRPH¶5HIHUHQFHVWRWKLVVKRUWIDOOLQWKH
literature have often been brief and largely supplementary, tending to dismiss it as a symptom 
of an overarching problem of ineffective tax administration. This article instead argues that the 
µILQDQFLDOIDLOXUH¶RIWKHWD[± i.e. its significant disappointment in yield ± was underpinned in 
all areas by commercial evasion, which had been facilitated by significant concessions towards 
the commercial interest in the substance of the tax. 
The article begins by discussing the desperate fiscal situation that necessitated the tax, and 
argues that effective targeting of commercial income was crucial in addressing the deficit 
arising from the expensive war with France. It then turns to consider the objections that were 
raised against an income tax. These objections are well-documented within the literature, as is 
the fact that the strength of objection led the government to impose a tax that was tolerant of 
evasion. However, this argument will be developed further by examining the particularly strong 
objections of the commercial interest. It will then be demonstrated that this interest wielded 
significant influence within and over parliament, providing them with a unique platform from 
which to put forward their objections. It is argued that this contributed to the adoption of further 
concessions in the substance of the tax, afforded specifically to commercial parties. It will be 
demonstrated that the most important of these concessions was the so-FDOOHGµVHFUHWSURFHGXUH¶, 
which effectively allowed commercial taxpayers to hide their declarations from everyone but 
                                                     
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Albert Farnsworth, Addington, Author of the Modern Income Tax, London, 1951. 
5
 B.E.V. Sabine, A History of Income Tax, London, 1966. 
6
 See, for example, Chantal Stebbings, 'The Budget of 1798: legislative provision for secrecy in 
income taxation' [1998] British Tax Review, 651; and John F. Avery Jones, 'The Sources of 
Addington's Income Tax' in Peter Harris and Dominic De Cogan (eds.), Studies in the History of Tax 
Law, vol. 7, Oxford, 2015, 1. 
 3 
the commercial commissioners, who had limited power to challenge the declaration.7 The 
article also considers the lack of effective centralized control over the tax, evident primarily 
through issues with the tax collectors. Again, this particularly pertains to commercial parties. 
These concessions, it will be demonstrated, allowed for easy evasion of the tax by the 
commercial sector. 
The article then moves on to demonstrate the key role of commercial income in accounting 
for the financial failure of the tax. The discrepancy between the estimated yield and that 
actually collected is considered, and it is demonstrated that only twenty-seven per cent of the 
predicted revenue from commercial income was actually collected. This contrasts with other 
forms of income where eighty-one per cent of the estimated sums were collected. This 
conclusion, that low revenue from commercial income was the key factor in accounting for the 
financial shortfall, is buttressed by various forms of evidence, and the argument that said 
shortfall can be accounted for primarily by miscalculation in 3LWW¶V estimates is rejected. This 
leads naturally to the conclusion that the responsibility for the financial failure of the tax can 
be principally attributed to evasion by the commercial sector of society. 
 
II. Context and concessions 
 
1. The lead-up to the tax 
The fiscal situation on the eve of the income tax in the late 1790s was a grave one. The 
eighteenth century had been characterized by a series of expensive wars, resulting in the 
DGRSWLRQRIZKDW%UHZHUKDVGXEEHG WKHµILVFDO-PLOLWDU\VWDWH¶:8 a system of public finance 
geared almost exclusively towards raising revenue to offset the debts of the previous war, 
whilst also funding the next. The sheer expense of these conflicts was addressed through the 
                                                     
7
 This issue has been discussed at length by Stebbings in 
7KH%XGJHWRI¶LELG as part of a 
larger study focusing on the culture of secrecy pervading all areas of the first tax. This article takes 
her conclusions further, in developing in detail the reasons behind the preferential treatment of the 
commercial interest, and exploring the effect that this treatment had in supporting a culture of 
commercial evasion of the tax. Importantly, this article also considers the evidence of this evasion, 
alongside the impact that it had on the yield of the tax. Ultimately, it demonstrates that commercial 
evasion is the key factor in explaining its financial failure. 
8
 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State 1688±1783, Oxford, 1989, 
repr. 2014. 
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creation of long-WHUPµIXQGHG¶GHEW9 the repayment of which was to be achieved through the 
development of a sinking fund,10 with an increase in taxation to secure the interest. This system 
was moderately successful during peacetime, when national income exceeded expenditure. 
However, in wartime, characterized by significant deficit and the accumulation of further debt, 
the amounts paid into the fund were too small to have any significant effect. As the amount of 
debt grew higher, so did the interest payments due, and consequently further, or higher, taxes 
were necessary to meet this cost.  
Thus, by the last decade of the eighteenth century, the country found itself engaged in 
the costliest war it had ever waged, subject to an unprecedented level of national debt, its only 
hope further imposition on the already overburdened taxpaying public.11 Pitt therefore 
recognized that in order to secure further borrowing, a new approach to taxation would be 
required. However, he was reluctant to immediately turn to a tax upon income, owing to the 
significant public and parliamentary opposition that would likely arise, opposition that was 
bolstered by, among others, the opinions of economic philosopher Adam Smith, who had 
insisted that a tax upon income was impossible without imposing an inquisitorial system.12 The 
period from 1793 to 1799 was therefore characterized by what economic historian Patrick 
2¶%ULHQKDV referred to as a µKROGLQJRSHUDWLRQ¶DJDLQVWWKHWD[a series of attempts by Pitt to 
                                                     
9
 This meant that borrowing was secured on the existence of a particular tax to cover the interest. See 
ibid., 116±120. 
10
 This involved the annual setting aside of revenue in order ultimately to redeem the debt: see, inter 
alia, Eric J. Evans, The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783±1870, 3rd ed., 
Harlow, 2001, 33; and Boyd Hilton, A Mad, Bad, & Dangerous People? England 1783±1846, 
Oxford, 2006, 115. 
11
 Total unredeemed capital of public debt had risen from £14.2 million in 1700, to £78 million in 
1750, to £391.2 million in 1798 (B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 
1962, 401-402). The political and economic quagmire that Pitt found himself in is summed up well by 
0RQURHµ$OOWKHIDPLOLDULQJUHGLHQWVRIILQDQFLDOFULVLVZHUHSUHVHQW«,QFUHDVHGWD[DWLRQZDV
LQHYLWDEOH3LWW¶VSUREOHP"+RZEHVWWRWLJKWHQWKHVFUHZ"¶Hubert Holmes Monroe, Intolerable 
Inquisition?: Reflections on the Law of Tax, London, 1981, 4. 
12
 According to Smith, µ$QLQTXLVLWLRQLQWRHYHU\PDQ¶VSULYDWHFLUFXPVWDQFHV«ZRXOGEHDVRXUFHRI
VXFKFRQWLQXDODQGHQGOHVVYH[DWLRQDVQRSHRSOHFRXOGVXSSRUW¶± An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 3 vols., 11th edition, London, vol. 3, 309. 
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raise sufficient revenue without having to resort to a general tax on income.13 7KLVµKROGLQJ
RSHUDWLRQ¶EHJDQZLWKDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHUDWHVRIH[LVWLQJH[SHQGLWXUHWD[HVQRWDEO\WKURXJK
WKHµWULSOHDVVHVVPHQW¶, whereby rates of existing so-FDOOHGµDVVHVVHG WD[HV¶ZHUHDUELWUDULO\
increased.14 Ultimately, these efforts fell far short of raising the required revenue, and Pitt was 
forced to turn to new sources of revenue in order to fund the increasingly expensive war 
effort.15 
One important factor in achieving revenue growth was the targeting of commercial 
income. Commercial income was particularly important considering the large-scale growth in 
WUDGHWKDWWKHFRXQWU\KDGVHHQDQGZDVFRQWLQXLQJWRVHHIURPWKHµFRQVXPHUUHYROXWLRQ¶RI
the eighteenth century, DQGWKHEXUJHRQLQJµLQGXVWULDOUHYROXWLRQ¶16 Although an increase in 
the number of articles subject to taxation meant that receipts from excise duties and assessed 
taxes rose, their effectiveness was limited as they provided no means of targeting the great 
profits accumulated by the wealthy traders, and largely maintained in capital. As Stebbings has 
QRWHG FRPPHUFLDO LQFRPH IRUPHG SDUW RI D µ³JUHDW PHDQV´ ZKLFK KDG KLWKHUWR UHPDLQHG 
XQWD[HG¶17 Considering both the scale of commercial income and the inadequacies of the 
existing taxes in targeting it, it would have been clear to Pitt that the key to unlocking greater 
UHYHQXH ZRXOG EH WR DFFHVV WKLV µJUHDW PHDQV¶ +RZHYHU WKLV ZRXOG SUove to be far from 
straightforward. As will now be discussed, strong opposition to the tax led to a generous system 
of taxation, particularly towards commercial income. 
 
                                                     
13
 P.K. O'Brien, 'The Political Economy of British Taxation, 1660Ǧ1815' 41 The Economic History 
Review (1988), 1, at 18. 
14
 For a good discussion of the growth of the assessed taxes, culminating in the triple assessment, see 
Sabine, A History of Income Tax, 19±24. 
15
 For a detailed discussion of the various efforts see, for example: Stephen Dowell, A History of 
Taxation and Taxes, 2nd ed., London, 1888, 208±224; and William Phillips, 'The Origin of Income 
Tax' [1967] British Tax Review, 113, particularly at 122. 
16
 As will be discussed below, Pitt estimated that the commercial sector produced forty-four per cent 
of national income. 
17
 6WHEELQJV
7KH%XGJHWRI¶DW 
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2. The advent of the income tax 
The impending tax on income was greatly unpopular, and this was apparent in the 
FRQWHPSRUDU\OLWHUDWXUH7KHWD[ZDVGHFODUHGµKLGHRXVDQGGHWHVWDEOH¶18 µLQLWVQDWXUHXQHTXDO
XQSULQFLSOHGXQMXVW¶19 DQGµLPSROLWLFDQGLUULWDWLQJ¶20 Particularly vocal in their opposition 
were the commercial interest, especially the merchants and traders of London.21 Despite 
officially approving the principle of a wartime income tax, the common council of the city of 
/RQGRQDGRSWHGDUHVROXWLRQLQ'HFHPEHUVWDWLQJµWKDt the said bill proposes to establish 
an inquisitorial power unknown in this country ± inconsistent with the principles of the British 
Constitution ± DQGUHSXJQDQWWRWKHIHHOLQJVRI(QJOLVKPHQ¶22 This identifies a key criticism 
that was voiced extensively by landed and commercial interests alike: namely that the tax 
constituted unwarranted official intrusion into the private affairs of its contributors. However, 
as will also be demonstrated, this argument is less than persuasive in accounting for the overall 
bad feeling towards the tax. Instead, two key explanations proposed by modern commentators 
HPHUJH ILUVW WKDW FRPSODLQWV ZHUH UHIOHFWLYH RI D SHUFHLYHG µEUHDFK RI FRQVHQW¶ E\ WKH
government; and second, and more relevant for our purposes, that they disguised dissatisfaction 
at a change in form of taxation, which had before allowed taxpayers to control, and often avoid, 
its full weight. The latter was especially true of the commercial interest, and provides a 
persuasive explanation for both commercial antipathy to the tax, and ultimately the concessions 
that Pitt was forced to make in its administration, concessions that proved particularly of 
benefit to the commercial community. 
As regards the threat of inquisition, this was a prevalent criticism of the new tax even 
in parliament. One mHPEHUVSRNHRIWD[FROOHFWRUVDVµa spy [that] comes, not only into the 
                                                     
18
 Benjamin Kingsbury, An Address to the People of Great Britain on the Subject of Mr Pitt's 
Proposed Tax on Income, London, 1798, 15. 
19
 Ibid., 20. 
20
 Estimate of the produce of the tax upon income; with a few observations on the impolicy of the 
measure, London, 1799, 15. For further evidence of opposition to the tax, see Benjamin Bell, Three 
Essays on Taxation of Income, London, 1799. 
21
 See, for example, the heated opposition to the tax by a draper of the city of London and future lord 
mayor: Robert Waithman, War proved to be the real cause of the present scarcity, 4th ed., London, 
1800. 
22
 As reported in Oracle and Daily Advertiser, 20 Dec. 1798, 3. The common council was officially 
comprised of the lord mayor, aldermen and various merchants and traders from across the city, and 
was styled as representative of the mercantile and trading interests of the city of London. 
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House, but opens the bureau of every man, and becomes acquainted with his most secret 
concerns'.23 This strength of feeling, although dramatic, is perhaps unsurprising. The violent 
French revolution, which had been triggered by oppressive governance, particularly through 
the heavy and regressive taxation imposed by the ancien régime, was still fresh in the public 
mind.24 An important example of this was the so-called vingtième, the pre-revolutionary French 
income tax, which had been poorly administered and was deeply unpopular, exempting the 
wealthy whilst overburdening the poor and middle classes. That this would have played into 
fears surrounding the prospect of a British income tax is very likely: a tax that not only allowed 
for government investigation into private affairs, but that had also been used as an instrument 
of oppression across the Channel would have been an alarming prospect for contemporaries. 
This fear of tyranny was only added to by the radical opinions of social philosophers such as 
Thomas Paine,25 who played an important role in both the American and French revolutions,26 
in expounding the rights of the ordinary man to rise up against unwarranted interference by the 
government, particularly in the face of excessive or intrusive taxation.27 These fears took place 
                                                     
23
 Parliamentary History, vol. 34, col. 91, 14 Dec. 1798 (House of Commons). 
24
 6HH'RZHOO¶VVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKHUHYROXWLRQKDGLQVSLUHGµIHHOLQJVRIDPD]HPHQWDQGKRUURU«>WKDW@
made a deep impression upon people of all classes iQWKLVFRXQWU\¶± A History of Taxation and Taxes, 
vol. 2, 208-209. That fears stemming from the French revolution fed into anti-income tax rhetoric is 
HYLGHQFHGE\0U7LHUQH\¶VDVVHUWLRQLQSDUOLDPHQWWKDWµWKLVPHDVXUHSXWVDWHQWKRIWKHSURSHUW\RI
England in a state of requisition ± a measure which the French have followed in their career of 
UHYROXWLRQDU\UDSLQH«¶± Parliamentary History, vol. 34, col. 22, 3 Dec. 1798 (House of Commons). 
For more on the role of tax in the French revolution, see William Doyle, The Oxford History of the 
French Revolution, 2nd ed., Oxford, 2002. 
25
 See his seminal work, 5LJKWVRI0DQEHLQJDQDQVZHUWR0U%XUNH¶VDWWDFNRQWKH)UHQFK
Revolution, London, 1791. 
26
 In particular, Paine was a popular and powerful advocate of American independence: see his 
pamphlet Common Sense; Addressed to the Inhabitants of America, Philadelphia, 1776. The 
American revolution in particular was a perfect example of successful action against state intrusion, 
having been triggered by dissatisfaction over the imposition of duties on tea by the British 
government, and ultimately resulting in national independence. For a detailed account of this see, 
James Coffield, A Popular History of Taxation: from ancient to modern times, Harlow, 1970, 
particularly at 82±88. 
27
 For a good discussion of this attitude and how this was exacerbated by onerous stamp duties on 
newspapers at the time, interpreted by many contemporaries as an unforgivable encroachment on 
 8 
against a backdrop of predominantly local control over taxation, particularly in the remote 
counties, as most taxes were assessed and collected by local men, before being remitted to 
London.28 Residents of these areas were unused to official involvement in local affairs,29 and 
although they might not object to answering to their µQDWXUDOVXSHULRUV¶LQWKHIRUPRIWKHORFDO
gentry or county magistrate,30 submitting to officials in London was a quite different prospect. 
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the concept of switching from a localized system of 
administration in all aspHFWVRIOLIHWRDFHQWUDOµLQTXLVLWLRQ¶UHVXOWHGLQVLJQLILFDQWREMHFWLRQ 
It was not only the fear of disclosure to state officials that concerned taxpayers. The 
SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW LW ZRXOG DOORZ IHOORZ FLWL]HQV NQRZOHGJH RI WKHLU QHLJKERXU¶V SDUWLFXODU
financial position was hotly opposed, most particularly by the commercial community.31 The 
key to understanding this fear lies in the particular nature of trade at the time, which was highly 
centred around credit. This, as Stebbings has noted, was vital to trDGLQJ VXFFHVV DV µPRVW
FRPPHUFHZDVFDUULHGRQHLWKHUE\VROHPHUFKDQWVRUVPDOOSDUWQHUVKLSV¶PHDQLQJWKDWµWKH
great majority of commercial men who needed further capital had no option but to turn to some 
IRUPRIFUHGLW¶32 The ability to obtain credit hLQJHGRQµWKHERUURZHU¶VJRRGQDPHDQGWKHIDLWK
DOHQGHUKDGLQKLVDELOLW\DQGLQWHQWLRQWRUHSD\¶33 and a great indicator of this would be the 
financial situation of the would-be debtor. If a creditor gained access to this information, there 
                                                     
press freedom, see L. Oats and P. Sadler, 'Stamp Duty, Propaganda and the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars' in John Tiley, ed., Studies in the History of Tax Law, vol. 1, Oxford, 2004, 243, at 
251±253. 
28
 The localized nature of taxation at the time has been explored in depth by Chantal Stebbings in her 
works: The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law: a study in constitutional conflict, Cambridge, 2009; and 
µ&RQVHQWDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\LQ1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\(QJOLVK7D[DWLRQ¶LQ-RKQ7LOH\HGStudies in 
the History of Tax Law, vol. 3, Oxford, 2009, 293. 
29
 As Hudson KDVGHVFULEHGµ«WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIRUGHUDQGMXVWLFHDQGPXFKHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDO
UHJXODWLRQZHUHGHYROYHGORFDOO\¶± Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1992, repr. 
1993, at 52. See discussion of the importance and consequences of local administration, below. 
30
 Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic Wars, 114. 
31
 For an in-depth consideration of this concern, see 6WHEELQJVµ7KH%XGJHWRI¶. See also the 
UHODWHGSRLQWGLVFXVVHGLQWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGDUWLFOHWKDWµGLVFORVXUHRIDJHQWOHPDQ¶VILQDQFLDO
circumstances might tend to the erosion of a generally accepted hierarchy where everyone knew his 
SODFH¶DW 
32
 Ibid., at 656. 
33
 Ibid., at 657. 
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would be an increased risk that he would refuse to lend to the debtor, or that he would impose 
onerous terms on the loan, in turn reducing engagement in trade. 7KLV ULVNHG µNLOO>LQJ@ WKH
SURYHUELDOJRRVHZKLFKODLGWKHJROGHQHJJV¶34 providing commercial parties with a platform 
upon which to push for secrecy in the tax.  
Further consideration shows that the sincerity of these complaints is doubtful, 
particularly with respect to commercial parties. The income tax was by no means the first 
inquisitorial intrusion intRDWD[SD\HU¶VSULYDWHOLIH7KHH[FLVHKDGEHHQDVRXUFHRIGLVFRQWHQW
on those grounds since its introduction in the seventeenth century, involving significant 
intrusion into the affairs of both manufacturers and merchants,35 and granting the government 
µDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\GHJUHHRIIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDOFRQWURO¶36 Bearing in mind the minute and 
onerous requirements upon manufacturers and traders under the excise scheme, an income tax 
was unlikely to prove any more inquisitorial than existing taxes.37 As Stebbings has suggested, 
WKLVUDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQDVWRZKHWKHUWKLVFRPSODLQWµZDV«JHQXLQH«RUZKHWKHULWZDVPHUHO\
a plausible concern raised to apply pressure to the government to ease the impact of a generally 
XQSRSXODU PHDVXUH¶38 Furthermore, that complaints of inquisition were made even despite 
3LWW¶VFRQFHVVLRQLQWKHZD\RIDVHFUHWSURFHGXUHSHUWDLQLQJWRFRPPHUFLDOSDUWLHVZKLFKDV
will be discussed below, effectively allowed them to hide their contributions, also casts doubt 
on the veracity of these complaints. 
Accordingly, discerning the true basis of anti-income tax sentiment requires further 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQ2QHH[SODQDWLRQFDQEHIRXQGLQZKDW'DXQWRQKDVVW\OHGµORVVRIFRQVHQW¶LH
that the government was to acquire the power to probe into the personal affairs of a gentleman 
                                                     
34
 Evans, The Forging of the Modern State, 101. See also the assertion of an anonymous 
FRQWHPSRUDU\SDPSKOHWHHUWKDWLIFUHGLWLVµWRXFKHGZLWKDUXGHKDQGLWZLOOIO\LQDWKRXVDQGSLHFHV
DQGEHLUUHFRYHUDEO\GHVWUR\HG¶± Estimate of the produce of the tax upon income, 13. 
35
 For a detailed discussion of this, see Chantal Stebbings, 'Traders, the Excise and the Law: Tensions 
and Conflicts in Early Nineteenth Century England' in John Tiley (ed.), Studies in the History of Tax 
Law, vol. 4, Oxford, 2010, 139, especially at 140±143. See particularly the VWDWHPHQWDWWKDWµWKH
relationship between the merchant community and the excise board was an exceptionally close and 
LQWHQVHRQH¶ 
36
 Ibid., 140. 
37
 See further Phillips, 'The Origin of Income Tax', at 114, and %(96DELQH
*UHDW%XGJHWV,3LWW¶V
Budget of 1799' [1970] British Tax Review, 201, at 210ERWKRIZKRPDUJXHWKDWµLQTXLVLWLRQ¶KDG
existed long before the income tax. 
38
 6WHEELQJVµ7KH%XGJHWRI¶DW 
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without his agreement.39 7KLV FDQ EH GHYHORSHG E\ WKH WKHRU\ RI µEUHDFK RI FRQVHQW¶ SXW
forward by Stebbings. She has argued that contemporaries believed themselves to possess a 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWWRµFRQVHQWWRWD[DWLRQ¶40 This could be achieved through real consent, or 
implied consent arising from local administration. The imposition of an objectionable, centrally 
administered tax therefore directly contravened perceived ideas of liberty and 
constitutionality.41 This chimed on another level with other, disenfranchised taxpayers who, 
SHUKDSV LQIOXHQFHG E\ WKH QRWLRQ RI µQR WD[DWLRQ ZLWKRXW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ WKURZQ XS E\ WKH
American revolution, had even less opportunity to consent to this new tax.42 This theme of lack 
of constitutionality is evident in the contemporary literature. That the government was to have 
the power to subject a gentleman to interview and to impose a judgment upon him without 
UHFRXUVHWRWKHFRXUWVZDVDFFRUGLQJWR6LU-RKQ6LQFODLUµWKHKHLJKWRIFUXHOW\ DQGLQMXVWLFH¶43 
3HUKDSVWKHQWKHUHDOREMHFWLRQWRWKHWD[ZDVOHVVWRLWVµLQTXLVLWRULDO¶QDWXUHDQGPRUHWKDW
it contravened what taxpayers perceived to be their rights as Englishmen. 
It seems that many objections to the tax were to its principle, based on the notion that 
WKHUH KDG EHHQ D EUHDFK RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ULJKW +RZHYHU 3LWW¶V LQWURGXFWLRQ RI VRPH ORFDO
administration alongside the principle of self-declaration, discussed below, went at least some 
way to offsetting these complaints by giving local communities a hand in their own tax 
collection. Despite this, opposition to the tax remained strong, suggesting another reason 
behind the general distaste. One answer to this was provided by Phillips: that objection to the 
tax can be explained by a change in form of taxation, from indirect to direct.44 As he notes: 
µGXULQJWKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\«WKHGRFWULQHKDGFRPHWREHXQLYHUVDOO\DFFHSWHGWKDWWD[HVRQ
so-called luxuries were optional taxes; income tax was clearly not an optional tax, and it 
therefore offended an idée fixe RQH YHU\ ILUPO\ IL[HG LQGHHG¶45 The income tax therefore 
served as a break with tradition, and a very convenient tradition at that: that the tax system was 
                                                     
39
 Martin Daunton, Trusting Leviathan: The Politics of Taxation in Britain, 1799±1914, Cambridge, 
2001, repr. 2007, 45. 
40
 Stebbings: 
&RQVHQWDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\¶The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law. 
41
 See, inter alia, 6WHEELQJVµ7KH%XGJHWRI¶SDUWLFXODUO\DW; and Monroe, Intolerable 
Inquisition?, particularly at 3. 
42
 See n 26, above. 
43
 Parliamentary History, vol. 34, col. 84, 14 Dec. 1798 (House of Commons). 
44
 William Phillips, 'The Real Objection to the Income Tax of 1799' [1967] British Tax Review 177. 
45
 Ibid., at 177. 
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based on regressive indirect taxation, targeting the poorer classes and allowing for easy 
avoidance by, and lesser impact upon, the wealthy.46 $V2¶%ULHQKDVVWDWHGµ>%\@«DSUXGHQW
selection of the commodities and social groups ³picked upon´ to bear the mounting exactions 
RI WKH VWDWH«ULVLQJ WD[DWLRQ«>ZDV PDGH@«WROHUDEOH DQG SROLWLFDOO\ PDQDJHDEOH¶47 As 
discussed above, the nature of the indirecWWD[HVKDGDOVRPHDQWWKDWµ9irtually no taxation fell 
XSRQEXVLQHVVSURILWVRUEXVLQHVVFDSLWDOV¶48 which is key in explaining the strong opposition 
of the commercial community to the income tax. For the first time, trading profits were 
threatened by taxation. This reveals what was likely the true commercial complaint: that they 
would be required to contribute more in the way of income tax than they had under any other 
tax ever before. 
 
3. The influence of the commercial interest 
That the weight of public opinion, particularly from the commercial sector, was set against the 
income tax from the beginning is well-established. What is less well understood is that 
commercial parties were subject to significant preferential treatment in terms of the application 
of the tax, particularly as against the landed classes. This primarily resulted from their strong 
influence over Parliament. This influence is not immediately obvious when looking at the 
distribution of political power at the time. For example, the city of London, possessing no doubt 
the largest trading population in the country, elected just four members of parliament of the 
total 558.49 Accordingly, direct political power on the part of the commercial sector was 
                                                     
46
 6HHIRUH[DPSOHWKHDWWLWXGHH[SUHVVHGE\DFRQWHPSRUDU\SDPSKOHWHHUWKDWµLWLVWRWKHPXOWLWXGH
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Collected for the Central Governments' 5 Journal of European Economic History (1976), 601, at 614. 
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DW7KLVFDUHIXOO\VHOHFWHGWD[EDVHDV2¶%ULHQSRLQWVRXWZDV
coupled with tolerance of evasion of other more direct taxes, making change even harder as a µEOLQG-
H\H¶DWWLWXGHZDVDOUHDG\GHHSO\LQJUDLQHGLQWD[DGPLQLVWUation. 
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 Peter Mathias, The First Industrial Nation: An Economic History of Britain 1700±1914, 2nd ed., 
Oxford, 1983, repr. 2001, 37. 
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 For an in-depth analysis of the political make-XSDWWKHWLPHVHHµ7KH&RQVWLWXHQFLHV¶LQR.G. 
Thorne (ed.), The History of Parliament: the House of Commons, 1790 ± 1820¶/RQGRQ
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limited. However, the mercantile interest in particular managed to make their influence felt in 
other, less direct, ways, by establishing for themselves a close, mutually beneficial relationship 
with the political class. This, as will be demonstrated, allowed them significant power over 
policymakers, affording them a position that ultimately played a part in the demise of the first 
income tax.  
 One way in which the commercial interest possessed political power was through its 
close relationship with the governing élite. Large trading interests sought to create solid 
relationships with politicians, forming powerful lobbies through which to press commercial 
objectives.50 These relationships were reflected in the demographic of parliament itself: 
according to Thorne,51 in the overall period of 1790 to 1820, thirteen members of parliament 
were, or had been, directors of the Bank of England, and thirty-two were directors of the East 
India Company.52 $V2¶%ULHQKDVSRLQWHGRXW 
 
[Chancellors] ran into determined and well-organised parliamentary opposition from 
political lobbies in the shape of the West India interest, the City of London members of 
parliament on the payroll of the East India Company and other trading corporations, 
ZKRDOOXVHGWKHLQIOXHQFHWKH\FRPPDQGHGWRGLYHUWWKH&KDQFHOORU¶VDWWHQWLRQDZD\
from foreign commerce.53 
 
 Another, more integral source of commercial influence came from its vital economic 
importance. This was manifested in two central ways. First, commercial income ostensibly 
                                                     
available at <http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/survey/i-constituencies> 
accessed 2 May 2017. 
50
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH(YDQV¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWµ'LUHFWRUVRIWKH(DVW,QGLD and South Sea Companies and 
the Committee of West Indian Planters and Merchants all had ready access to powerful politicians to 
SUHVVWKHLULQWHUHVWV«¶± Evans, The Forging of the Modern State, 376HHDOVR3RUWHU¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI
µWKHPHUFDQWLOHFODVVHV«FXUU\LQJPLQLVWHULDOIDYRXU¶ZLWKµPDVWHUPDQXIDFWXUHUV«DUJX>LQJ@IRUWKHLU
preferred commercial policies in the snuff-filled ante-URRPVRI:HVWPLQVWHU¶± Roy Porter, English 
Society in the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed., London, 1990, 75. 
51
 
7KH0HPEHUV¶LQThe History of Parliament, available at 
<http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/survey/iii-members> accessed 4 Jan. 
2017. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 O'Brien, 'Political Economy', at 24. 
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accounted for forty-four per cent of national income.54 For the government to work against the 
commercial interest, therefore, risked undermining the entire economy.55 Second, and arguably 
even more importantly, the great trading entities of the city of London, such as the East India 
and South Sea Companies, and the Bank of England, financed loans to the government that 
kept the wartime nation afloat. This has OHG 'LFNLQVRQ WR DUJXH WKDW µ:KDW JDYH WKHVH
institutions political power was not their votes, but their ability to raise substantial loans for 
WKH7UHDVXU\ZKHQHYHU WKHJRYHUQPHQW UHTXLUHG WKHP¶56 The importance of this cannot be 
understated: in a time of economic difficulty, fighting an expensive war and with a high 
national debt, to ignore the voices of those propping up the economy would have been 
disastrous. It is little wonder, then, that the government found complaints against the income 
tax from the mercantile interest particularly persuasive. 
 These mercantile interests were also particularly valuable as they provided a route by 
which the nation could assert its aspirations to empire. As Colley has asserted, the élite believed 
µWKDWFRPPHUFH«ZDVWKHHQJLQHWKDWGURYHDVWDWH¶VSRZHUDQGZHDOWK«DQGWKDW LI%ULWLVK
traders were to succeed in the struggle [to win access to foreign markets and materials], they 
PXVWEHYLJRURXVO\VXSSRUWHGDEURDGDQGSURWHFWHGDWKRPH¶57 This need to protect trade in 
order to dominate on an international level was arguably more important in 1799 than ever 
EHIRUHJLYHQWKDWµWKH)UHQFK5HYROXWLRQIROORZHGE\DJOREDOZDUSURYLGHG%ULWDLQ«ZLWK
DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRFDSWXUHDQGUHWDLQDQ³LQRUGLQDWH´VKDUHRIWKHZRUOGPDUNHWV¶58 Thus, trading 
interests were seen as key both to retaining %ULWDLQ¶V international reputation, and also to 
succeeding in the war against France.59 Imposing a system of taxation that risked inhibiting 
                                                     
54
 6HH3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVRIQDWLRQDOLQFRPHGLVFXVVed below. 
55
 6HHIRUH[DPSOH6WHEELQJV¶VDFFRXQWRIKRZH[FHVVLYHH[FLVHGXWLHVHDUOLHULQWKHHLJKWHHQWK
FHQWXU\VDZµVRPHRIWKHODUJHVWPDQXIDFWXUHUV>LQ6FRWODQG@«IRUFHGRXWRIEXVLQHVVE\WKH
depressed state of trade caused directly by excise regulatLRQ¶± µ7UDGHUVWKH([FLVHDQGWKH/DZ¶DW
143. 
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 H. T. Dickinson, The Politics of the People in Eighteenth-Century Britain, New York, 1995, 61. 
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58
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System, Cambridge, 1991, 185. 
59
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 14 
their activities therefore threatened not only the value of trade, but also British international 
supremacy.60 
 By the end of the eighteenth century, then, the commercial interest occupied a 
privileged position in the political fabric. There are many examples of this interest spilling over 
into policymaking, such as the awarding of trading monopolies to the large merchant entities, 
and also the future enactment of the corn laws in 1815.61 However, one particular example of 
the power that traders had over policy is that of the 1733 excise crisis, when Prime Minister 
Robert Walpole intended to replace the land tax with higher rates of excise duty, most 
particularly on wine and tobacco.62 This was ultimately defeated by an extensive campaign by 
the commercial sector, wKHUHE\µ0HUFKDQWV«PRELOL]HGSXEOLFRSLQLRQ¶63 by petitioning and 
disseminating publications intended to whip up feeling against the proposals, eliciting a 
UHDFWLRQ WKDW /DQJIRUG DUJXHV µZRXOG QRW KDYH EHHQ SRVVLEOH ZLWKRXW VNLOOHG DQG YLJRURXV
leadership, such as came from the City of London, the home of the great plutocratic merchant 
KRXVHVDVZHOODVRQHRIWKHVWURQJHVWFHQWUHVRIRSSRVLWLRQWRJRYHUQPHQW¶64 This exercise of 
commercial power against government was replicated on numerous occasions throughout the 
eighteenth century.65  
In light of the above discussion, it is reasonable to suggest that the views of the 
commercial community held significant weight with both parliament and the executive at the 
point that the income tax was proposed. The position was summed up in parliament by Mr 
Rose, who aUJXHGWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWµZHUHQRZSURVWUDWHDWWKHIHHWRIWKH3DUOLDPHQWRIWKH
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Mansion-+RXVH¶66 However, this begs the question why, given the strength of feeling against 
it, the tax was not scrapped as the excise proposals had been in 1733. Despite their objections 
to its mode of collection, the court of common council approved the principle of an income 
tax.67 The answer lies again in the relationship that businessmen had with government: it was 
simply not in their interest to oppose the tax completely. This can be explained by a number of 
factors, which will be considered in turn. 
 First, although as we have seen the country was dependent on traders in a number of 
ways, this was far from non-reciprocal. As Colley has pointed out, loyalty paid.68 Traders 
depended on the protection of the state to pursue commercial activity abroad, both directly, 
through the granting of monopolies such as those awarded to the East India Company, and 
indirectly, through the protection of merchant ships en route to foreign markets by the navy. 
They also depended on the government for preferential trade conditions at home: as has been 
discussed, the overall system of taxation allowed the commercial community largely to escape 
its scope. In order to secure the continued favour of government, traders by and large supported 
their various efforts, most crucially in a financial sense.69  
Moreover, many traders actually benefited from the war. As discussed above, it was 
often the large trading interests that financed the wars, leading to beneficial interest rates and 
LQFRPHVHFXULW\)XUWKHUPRUHZDUZLWK)UDQFHDV%ULWDLQ¶VODUJHVWWUDGLQJULYDOSURYLGHGWKH
opportunity for the commercial interest to benefit from French markets and lands abroad, 
should Britain win.70 The potential benefits of war would likely have proved irresistible to 
businessmen: accordingly, it was in their best interests to promote both supportive relationships 
with the government, and as successful a war as possible. 
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 Moreover, the risk of invasion threatened the commercial community as much as any 
RWKHU QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVW $V &ROOH\ KDV SRLQWHG RXW µWKUHDWHQHG LQYDVLRQ IURP DEURDG«ZDV
DOPRVWFHUWDLQWRGLVUXSWEXVLQHVVDQGHQGDQJHUPRQH\VXSSO\DQGFUHGLW¶71 Accordingly, to 
campaign contrary to the war effort would potentially have proved counterproductive 
financially, as well as politically. 
 In presenting too strong an opposition to the income tax, then, traders risked their 
influential position in society, as well as their financial well-being. Nonetheless, the fact 
remained that the income tax would prove an unacceptable encroachment on their profits. In 
using their influence to negotiate a preferential system of assessment, however, the commercial 
interest sought to achieve the best of both worlds: to avoid much of the impact of the tax, whilst 
still maintaining the appearance of compliance. This was achieved in several key ways, 
centring on the role played by the so-called secret procedure available to the commercial 
interest. 
 
4. Making the tax more palatable: general concessions 
That there was strong, principled objection to the imposition of the tax is clear. As a result, in 
enforcing the tax the legislature found itself torn between strict enforcement, risking an 
uprising such as that that had characterized the excise crisis, or acquiescence to public opinion, 
potentially undermining the tax as a revenue generator. An anonymous pamphleteer expressed 
this dilemma at the time: µLILWEHVHYHUHDQGULJRURXVLWZLOOEHRSSUHVVLYHDQGYH[DWLRXVLI
less VWULFWDQGULJLGLWZLOORSHQWKHGRRUWRIUDXGDQGHYDVLRQ¶72 Pitt chose the latter option, 
thereby imposing a tolerant system of tax collection that was relatively easy to evade.73 In order 
to demonstrate this, it is necessary first to consider the general provisions of the Act, followed 
by the aspects of the tax most demonstrative of concession to public opinion, namely the 
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principle of self-declaration and the lack of effective centralized control inherent in the tax. It 
is these concessions that were developed even further with regard to commercial income.  
,QFRPHIRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH$FWZDVWDNHQWRPHDQµQRWOHVVWKDQWKHIXOO$PRXQW
of the Profits or Gains of such Trade, Profession, Office, Pension, Stipend, Employment, or 
9RFDWLRQ¶74 Gross income was subject to general deductions,75 intended to offset the impact 
of the tax on those who had particular demands on their income. For example, deductions were 
permitted for children, owing to their dependency on the taxpayer. There were then further 
µVSHFLILFGHGXFWLRQV¶IRUHDFKQDPHGKHDGRILQFRPHWKHUHOHYDQWGHGXFWLRQVIor trade being 
comprised in the fifteenth case of schedule A of the Act.76  This included, for example, monies 
SDLGLQZDJHVDQGVKDUHKROGHUV¶GLYLGHQGV 
Taxable income was self-declared in that the taxpayer would make a statement as to his 
income, alongside relevant deductions. This could be challenged should the commissioner 
believe it to be incorrect, but importantly the commissioner had no power to inspect the books 
of the taxpayer.77 This system of self-declaration with assessors lacking the power to access 
accounts without consent rendered the process almost voluntary in nature, and consequently 
dependent, as Sir John Sinclair argued in parliament at the time, µon the voluntary seal, and 
XQIRUWXQDWHO\WKHOD[PRUDOLW\RI«WKHSHRSOH¶.78 Self-declaration had opened up the system 
to evasion under the triple assessment,79 and there was every reason to suggest that it would 
have the same effect on the income tax. 
Pitt thus pXWKLVIDLWKLQWKHµJHQHUDOKRQHVW\¶RIWKHSXEOLF80 His only answer to the 
possibility of evasion was, in addition to allocating responsibility for tax collection to local 
commissioners,81 to appoint D VXUYH\RU UHVSRQVLEOH IRU µOD\>LQJ@EHIRUH WKH commissioners 
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such grounds of doubt, as may occur to him on the fairness of the rate at which a party may 
KDYHDVVHVVHGKLPVHOI¶82 Such doubts were then to be reported to the commissioners, such that 
µWKH\ PD\ FDOO IRU IDUWKHU H[SODQDWLRQ IURP WKH SHUVRQ FRQFHUQHG¶83 but as Seligman has 
SRLQWHGRXW µQR WD[SD\HUZDV FRPSHOOHG WR DQVZHUDQ\TXHVWLRQ¶84 This is not to say that 
FRPPLVVLRQHUVZHUHSRZHUOHVVLQWKHHYHQWRIVXVSHFWHGHYDVLRQ$V3LWWKLPVHOIZDUQHGµ,I
however, he [the tax payer] declines to sXEPLWWRWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIKLVERRNV«LWVKDOOEH
competent for the commissioners to fix the assessment, and their decision shall be final, unless 
KHDSSHDOVWRWKHKLJKHUFRPPLVVLRQHU¶85 However, the effectiveness of this deterrent against 
evasion was undermined in several key ways. The lack of power to investigate meant that any 
evidence of evasion presented by the surveyor, just as any assessment that the commissioner 
PD\ µIL[¶ ZRXOG UHVXOW IURP PHUH JXHVVZRUN 7KLV ZRXOG QDWXUDOO\ EH EDVHG RQ H[WHUQDl 
indicators, such as outward appearance of wealth and known local investment, making it a far 
from accurate assessment. This inherent inaccuracy essentially rendered the state incapable of 
obtaining a fully comprehensive return. Thus, evasion by under-declaration was to a large 
extent unchallengeable, rendering it inevitable. 
It must also be remembered that commissioners were often overworked, and their 
loyalties were split. The commissioners themselves were selected by the grand jury from the 
existing land tax cRPPLVVLRQHUV IRU WKDW DUHD DQG WHQ RWKHUV µDOVR VR TXDOLILHG¶86 The 
responsibility of such a small number of men for the accuracy of the hundreds, if not thousands, 
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of assessments from their locality was an important limiting factor.87 Placing the administration 
of the tax in the hands of mainly local men was a concession to the fears of bureaucracy by 
those geographically divorced from London. Stebbings has discussed the need for local 
administration of the tax,88 SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWµVHOI-JRYHUQPHQW«ZDVHQJUDLQHGLQVRFLHW\¶DW
the time,89 DQGWKDWWKHUHIRUHLQOLJKWRIWKHVWURQJRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHWD[µWRXVHDWUDGLWLRQDO
PHDQVRI WD[DGPLQLVWUDWLRQZKLFKZDV IDPLOLDU«ZDVDSRZHUIXOSDFLILHU¶90 However, the 
emphasis on local administration had significant consequences. Commissioners appear to have 
UHJDUGHGWKHPVHOYHVDVµUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHWD[SD\HUVDQGPLJKWQDWXUDOO\EHVXSSRVHGWR
GHIHQG WKHLU OHJLWLPDWH LQWHUHVWV DJDLQVW WKH WUHDVXU\¶91 They had little interest in sending 
money outside of their locality, and less incentive still to contradict a declaration made by a 
prominent local figure. Ultimately, the role of commissioners as a safeguard against evasion 
was significantly flawed. 
 Although these concessions undoubtedly contributed to the culture of evasion 
surrounding the tax, the public at large did pay their dues, albeit reluctantly. As will be 
discussed below, together the yield of the tax from non-commercial sectors accounted for 
almost eighty-one per cent of that anticipated. This, when compared to a mere twenty-seven 
per cent from the commercial community, was a relatively successful result. As commentators 
have pointed out, during this period the landed interest in particular did pay the high taxes that 
they complained about so vociferously (albeit grudgingly).92 Accordingly, it seems that, 
although general administrative issues with the tax and its general commissioners played a part 
in the financial failure of the tax, these issues alone are not persuasive. Instead, it is necessary 
to turn to the particular concessions made to the commercial sector, in order to understand why 
the tax failed so spectacularly in generating revenue. 
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 See discussion of this in, for example, Sabine, A History of Income Tax, 33-34. For a detailed 
account of the day to day administration of the tax, see Hope-Jones, Income Tax in the Napoleonic 
Wars, 21±47. 
88
 See Stebbings, The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law. 
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 Ibid. at 23. 
90
 Ibid. at 25. 
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 Seligman, The Income Tax, 82. 
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 See, inter alia, Evans, The Forging of the Modern State, at 94, 101 and 116; and Philip Harling, The 
Waning of 'Old Corruption': The Politics of Economical Reform in Britain, 1779±1846, Oxford, 1996, 
56-57. 
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5. Concessions and commercial income 
It has already been established that, at the point of the introduction of the income tax, the 
commercial interest wielded significant political power. Indeed, Pitt himself seems to have 
recognizHGWKLVHYLGHQFHGE\KLVFRQVXOWDWLRQZLWKWKHµFRPPHUFLDOFRmmunity of the City of 
/RQGRQZLWKZKRPKHDSSHDUHG WRHQMR\JRRG UHODWLRQV¶93 That their concerns led him to 
propose a lenient system of taxation, especially towards the trading community, seems 
extremely likely, considering the overwhelming evidence of their indirect political power. This 
generous scheme of assessment manifested itself in several key ways, as will now be 
considered. 
Unlike in modern systems of taxation, the principle of a ten per cent tax on income, at 
least in theory, applied equally to both natural persons and commercial entities.94 Deductions 
were similarly permitted and, in the case of corporations, included income designated for the 
payment of dividends,95 on the basis that they would be taxed via the income of the shareholder. 
Although commercial parties were taxed in a broadly similar way to other classes of taxpayer, 
the method of assessment and tax return was vastly different. Local administration such as that 
pertaining to non-commercial returns would mean, as Stebbings has pointed out, that 
FRPPLVVLRQHUVµZRXOGEHFRPHIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHILQDQFLDODIIDLUVRIPHQZKRPLJKWZHOOEH
WKHLU ULYDOV LQ WUDGH¶96 PHDQLQJ WKDW µWKH YHU\ OLYHOLKRRGV RI FRPPHUFLDO PHQ PLJKW EH
FRPSURPLVHG¶97 In light of this,98 Pitt inserted what became section 96 of the Income Tax Act, 
holding that commercial parties could elect to be assessed by commercial commissioners, 
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 6WHEELQJVµ7KH%XGJHWRI¶DW 
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 The Income Tax Act, s. 87. 
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 Ibid., at s. 88. 
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 Stebbings, The Victorian Taxpayer and the Law, 28. 
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 6WHEELQJVµ7KH%XGJHWRI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 See e.g. Farnsworth, Addington, Author of the Modern Income Tax, IRUDQDFFRXQWRIWKHµVWUHQJWK
RIWKHPHUFDQWLOHFRPPXQLW\«IRUF>LQJ@¶3LWWWRFRQFHGHWRWKHFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWWKURXJKWKH
introduction of the commercial commissioners, at 13. Further to this, see also Seligman, The Income 
Tax, at 82. 
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rather than commissioners for general purposes.99 Returns made to the commercial 
commissioners were kept secret, entered into an assessment book and marked only by a number 
that matched that on the certificate of assessment.100 In line with other returns, income was 
self-declared, and was only to be investigated should the commissioner have doubts over the 
accuracy of the disclosure. In the event of a commercial commissioner harbouring such 
VXVSLFLRQVKHZDVHQWLWOHGWRFDOOWZRDVVLVWDQWVWRMXGJHWKHµUHSXWHGLQFRPH¶RIWKHSDUW\,I
they judged the declaration to be too low, the commissioner could then interview two 
connected persons in order to ascertain the truth, before imposing an assessment.101 
Importantly, however, no power was granted to examine the accounts of the party, and so the 
basis for any assessment was limited to hearsay. Secrecy could be justified on the grounds that 
it prevented competitors from accessing information,102 but in concealing the declaration from 
all but the commercial commissioners, any external checks on its veracity were rendered 
LPSRVVLEOH$V-HQNLQVRQDUJXHGDW WKH WLPH µ:KHUHYHUFRQFHDOPHQW LVQRWQHFHVVDU\ LW LV 
REMHFWLRQDEOH«>DV@DGRRU>ZRXOG@EHRSHQHGE\WKDWPHDQVWRIUDXGDQGHYDVLRQ¶103 
This secrecy was perhaps even more of an issue than in the context of other, non-
commercial income. For example, the means of a landed gentleman were usually evident in his 
lifestyle, for instance, through his large house, his servants, and his expensive commodities. 
$V-RKQ6LQFODLUVWDWHGµ,WLVQDWXUDOWRVXSSRVHWKDWHYHU\LQGLYLGXDOQHDUO\LQSURSRUWLRQWR
his property would procure for himself the convenience of being well-ORGJHG¶104 However, the 
wealth of commercial parties was far less outwardly apparent. This was compounded by the 
fact that commercial cRPPLVVLRQHUV µDFWHG IRU D PXFK ZLGHU DUHD¶ WKDQ JHQHUDO
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 &RPPHUFLDOFRPPLVVLRQHUVZHUHRQO\DEOHWRDVVHVVLQFRPHDULVLQJIURPWKRVHµHQJDJHGLQDQ\
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commissioners,105 and therefore lacked local knowledge.106 Furthermore, they generally 
possessed no skills in accountancy, and did not have an adequate workforce at their disposal.  
 Moreover, even if a commercial commissioner had reason to suspect evasion, he may 
have had little interest in pursuing the matter further, particularly in London. By virtue of 
section 110 of the Income Tax Act, of the eighteen commercial commissioners for London, 
thirteen were to be chosen by the large corporations based in London.107 That commercial 
parties held the power of selection over commissioners raises questions over the loyalties of 
those selected, and as a result their interest in enforcing the tax. It is certainly likely that 
commercial commissioners were not the strictest enforcers of the tax, given their interest in 
both protecting their fellow commercial men, and potentially also in the failure of the tax, as a 
threat to their profits. 
 The combination of these concessions meant that evasion of the tax would have been 
very simple. All that was required for a commercial taxpayer to avoid the full force of a tax 
was for him to under-declare his income, or to exaggerate the scale of the approved deductions, 
such as those on account of his children, for the interest due on his debts, or for the annuities 
he was bound to pay.108 The potential for such evasion was recognized from the start, with a 
contemporary member of parliament SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWµas [commercial] property was generally 
LQ VWRFN WKH PDQXIDFWXUHUV«ZLOO EH LQGXFHG to undervalue it, and thus avoid the tax 
altogether'.109 Bearing in mind the commercial cRPPLVVLRQHUV¶ KHDY\ ZRUNORDG FRPELQHG
with the difficulty of proving a declaration to be false, alongside issues of bias, such 
declarations were unlikely to be challenged. Furthermore, as Stopforth has argued, the system 
was also open to avoidance of the tax, for example, by transferring assets to family members, 
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 See complaints to this effect in the report of the commissioners for the affairs of taxes, held at The 
National Archives: Public Record Office (PRO) 30/8/279, part 2. 
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creating trusts in their favour, or granting annuities.110 Primitive forms of avoidance by 
transferring assets µRIIVKRUH¶KDGDOVRGHYHORSHGE\WKLVSRLQW111 although it is unclear how 
effective this would have been in respect of the income tax, given the operation of the tax on a 
remittance basis, FRXSOHGZLWK(QJODQG¶VSRVLWLRQDVWKHPDLQWUDGLQJPDUNHW112 In any event, 
ease of evasion would likely have rendered most forms of avoidance unnecessary, although as 
6WRSIRUWKKDVSRLQWHGRXWµWKHIXQGDPHQWDOIODZXSRQZKLFKPXFKWD[DYRLGDQFHZDVODWHU
EDVHGZDVLQKHUHQWLQWKHV\VWHPULJKWIURPWKHVWDUW¶113  
 It seems that evasion was both simple to commit and facilitated by lax administration 
of the tax. This was recognized at the time, for example by Lord Hawkesbury, who was 
reported by The Morning Post and Gazetteer as attributing large-VFDOHHYDVLRQWRµWKHfacility 
ZLWKZKLFK>LW@PLJKWEHFRPPLWWHG¶114 Importantly, however, one also finds in contemporary 
sources an indication that it was the treatment of commercial income that caused the most 
significant problems. When asked by Pitt to account for the low yield, the commissioners for 
the affairs of tD[HVLGHQWLILHGWKDWµWKHWKLUGRIWKHPDLQFDXVHVIRUWKHJUHDWGHIDOFDWLRQLQWKH
\LHOGRIWKHWD[ZDVDWWULEXWHG«WRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQRIWKH&RPPHUFLDO&RPPLVVLRQHUV¶DQGWKDW
DVVXFKµWRWDODEROLWLRQRIWKH&RPmercial Commissioners (except in London) is most strongly 
UHFRPPHQGHG¶115 This is a strong indicator that it was evasion of the tax on commercial 
income that was key to the ultimate shortfall in the yield of the tax. The extent of this shortfall, 
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and the direct evidence of lack of commercial contribution, have passed largely unnoticed in 
the literature. 
 
III. The financial failure of the tax re-examined 
 
In light of the above discussion, it is fair to say that the 1799 income tax was particularly 
generous to commercial parties, as it allowed for widespread evasion without significant 
difficulty. However, unequivocally demonstrating that this failure to target commercial income 
was key in accounting for the overall financial failure of the tax poses a significant challenge, 
and has not been attempted in the existing literature. One reason for this is a lack of 
documentation, owing both to the destruction of many of the documents upon the abolition of 
the tax, and also to the secret procedure inherent in the collection of the tax on commercial 
income.116 A further complicating factor is that, as the Act required no differentiation between 
genres of income, the tD[SD\HU¶V GHFODUDWLRQ RI OLDELOLW\ ZDV JHQHUDO LQ QDWXUH117 For that 
reason, it is impossible to know the exact figure of returns from commercial income: the only 
method of gaining even an indication of this is to consider the amount returned to commercial 
commissioners.118 Assessment by commercial commissioners was voluntary, and was also 
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 Some documents relating to the tax collected by the commercial commissioners have survived, and 
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only available in the major trading locations within the country, meaning that their returns were 
by no means reflective of all commercial tax contributions.119 
However, the elective nature of the process does not seem significantly problematic to our 
analysis, considering that, in light of concerns over inquisition and public disclosure of returns, 
it seems logical that commercial parties would have wished to take advantage of the secret 
procedure available to them wherever possible. Moreover, despite the limited availability of 
commercial commissioners within the country as a whole, the counties to which they were 
allocated covered most significant trading areas at the time.120 As such, it is unlikely that the 
commercial yield from other localities could amount to a figure significant enough to offset 
what we will see to be very strong evidence of commercial evasion, particularly considering 
that these areas were likely to be populated mainly by local traders and shopkeepers, therefore 
with little to contribute in the way of income tax. Therefore, although not exact, it seems logical 
to assume that the amount returned to commercial commissioners accounted for the majority 
of the commercial yield of the tax. 
Accordingly, evasion by commercial parties cannot be demonstrated with absolute 
certainty. However, close inspection of statistical data from the returns submitted to 
commercial commissioners suggests that the shortfall in yield, even despite the incomplete 
nature of this data, was both so great and so inconsistent with other indicators of commercial 
income at the time that the case for the charge of widespread evasion is compelling.  
 
1. The discrepancy between estimates and the actual yield 
That the tax failed overall is easy to demonstrate: it consistently fell short of its projected yield, 
even despite a reduction in the estimates for each year, as demonstrated by Figure 1.  
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 According to Accounts respecting the income duty in Great Britain, for the year ended fifth April 
1801, P.P. 1802 (112) viii 879, of the fifty-seven counties used for tax purposes, only twenty, slightly 
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120
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the tax overall, of which over £1.25 million was accounted for by returns to commercial 
commissioners ± ibid. 
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Figure 1: Demonstrating the difference between the estimated tax yield and the actual tax 
yield: 1799 ± 1801.121 
(SEE FIGURE 1) 
 
In producing his estimates, Pitt calculated the net income of the country during 1798 
from various forms of profit-PDNLQJDFWLYLW\7KHVHµKHDGVRILQFRPH¶DUHUHSURGXFHGLQ7DEOH
1. 
 
Table 1: 3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVRIQDWLRQDOLQFRPH.122 
(SEE TABLE 1) 
 
3LWW¶VLQLWLDOHVWLPDWHIRUWKHRYHUDll yield of the income tax for 1799 was calculated by 
the percentage rate of tax, ten per cent, of overall taxable national income: £10.2 million from 
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 Authority for estimates: Parliamentary History, vol. 34, cols. 10±18, 3 Dec. 1798 (House of 
Commons); vol. 34, col. 1517, 24 Feb. 1800 (House of Commons); vol. 35, col. 973, 18 Feb. 1801 
(House of Commons). 
Authority for yields: Parliamentary Register, vol. 12, p. 54, 5 June 1800 (House of Commons); 
Accounts Relating to Assessment and Produce of Income Duty, 1800-1801, P.P. 1801-1802 (41) iv 
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For a detailed discussion of these figures, see Farnsworth, Addington, Author of the Modern Income 
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profits accounted for fifteen per cent of the value of imports and exports (at col. 16), and that 
domestic trade accounted for four times the value of exports (at col. 17). These figures apparently 
have no real source other than educated supposition. This raises issues regarding WKHYLDELOLW\RI3LWW¶V
expectations. This will be explored in greater detail below. 
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£102 million.123 It therefore follows that the commercial specific yield was £4.5 million, with 
the income arising from commercial activity estimated at £45 million.124 
However, it became quickly apparent at the conclusion of the 1799 tax year that the tax 
had fallen markedly short of the estimates. The overall yield for the 1799 tax year was around 
£5.8 million.125 Significantly, of this sum less than £1.2 million arose from assessments by 
commercial commissioners.126 This was less than twenty-one per cent of the overall yield, far 
short RI3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHRIIRUW\-four per cent. That all other income combined accounted for 
almost eighty per cent of the overall yield is the first indication of the serious problems 
associated with taxing commercial income. The proportionate shortfall of revenue collected by 
commercial commissioners compared to the commercial estimates is displayed in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Demonstrating the distribution of estimated and actual yield ± 1799 
(SEE FIGURE 2) 
 
Another way to approach these figures is to point out that the actual revenue collected 
on commercial income accounted for a mere twenty-seven per cent of the £4.5 million 
predicted, compared to the almost eighty-one per cent of expected revenue collected from all 
other classes of taxpayer. This is illustrated by Figure 3. 
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 Pitt rounded this figure to £10 million, presumably for ease of calculation. However, in the 
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 This being comprised of: £12 million arising from profits on the capital employed in foreign 
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 Parliamentary Register, vol. 12, p. 54, 5 June 1800 (House of Commons). 
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 An Account of the Total Produce of the Tax upon Income, for the Year ending the 5th of April 
1800, P.P. 1799-1800 cxxx 311. It is unclear whether this figure relates only to contributions arising 
from trade income, or from all income submitted by traders (i.e. trading income or otherwise), which 
was eligible for submission to commercial commissioners by virtue of section 96 of the 1799 Act. 
Unlike in subsequent years, the figure is provided as one, with no breakdown of income derived from 
commercial and non-commercial sources. Therefore, all that can be said is that the actual returns from 
commercial income may have been significantly lower than £1.2 million. This may have been by as 
much as £400,000, given that this was the non-trading figure the following year ± Accounts respecting 
the income duty in Great Britain, for the year ended fifth April 1801, P.P. 1802 (112) viii 879. 
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Figure 3: Shortfall of actual yield compared to that estimated, per genre of income ± 1799 
(SEE FIGURE 3) 
 
This disappointing yield was not merely the result of teething problems arising from 
the first year of a new tax. The revenue generated during the 1800 tax year, although improved, 
still fell significantly short of the revised expectation of £7 million,127 accounting for just under 
£5.9 million in total net revenue.128 Of this sum, not quite £1.2 million was accounted for by 
commercial assessments.129 It seems that the tax, although not a success overall, failed 
particularly in collecting income from the commercial sector.  
In explaining the low commercial yield, there are two logical possibilities. The first is that 
proposed by the contemporary pamphleteer Henry Beeke,130 QDPHO\WKDW3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVZHUH
drastically wrong and that the tax was therefore incapable of producing the figures estimated. 
This argument will be fully considered below, but at the outset it should be noted that, despite 
LVVXHV ZLWK WKH SURYHQDQFH RI 3LWW¶V HVWLPDWHV131 the suggestion that the government 
overestimated taxable commercial income by over two-thirds is implausible. Instead, the 
second explanation is much more persuasive: that the yield from commercial parties should 
have been much higher than it was, and accordingly that the shortfall in yield can only be 
accounted for by widespread evasion of the tax. The evidence of this evasion, albeit indirect, 
is strong, and goes a long way to dispensing with WKHDUJXPHQW WKDW LWZDVD IDXOW LQ3LWW¶V
projections that was responsible for the commercial shortfall. 
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 Accounts respecting the income duty in Great Britain, for the year ended fifth April 1801, P.P. 
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2. %HHNH¶VDUJXPHQW 
In making his argument that the official estimates were faulty, Beeke argued that Pitt had 
underestimated the value of relevant deductions:  
 
7KHDFFRXQWRIRXUFRPPHUFH«LVRIDPDJQLWXGHDVWRQLVKLQJDQGXQSDUDOOHOHGDQG\HW
the public expectation has certainly been greatly disappointed as to the produce of that 
part of the income tax which results from the profit of it. Either, therefore, the value of 
our trade has been exaggerated, or gross evasions must have been practised in the 
declarations of commercial income; or else the proportion of the commercial profit of 
Great Britain to the annual value of its exports and imports, has been considerably 
miscalculated.132 
 
In favouring the latter view, Beeke provided his own estimates, crucially that a more accurate 
figure for taxable income was £65 million, and that therefore the tax could not hope to achieve 
more than £6.5 million,133 of which £2.8 million would arise from commercial income.134 This, 
of course, was still in itself much higher than the figure of £1.2 million actually collected from 
FRPPHUFLDOSDUWLHV%HHNHDFFRXQWVIRUWKLVE\VWDWLQJWKDWµVRPHFRQFHDOPHQWVDQGVRPHDUts 
of evasion, have been practised, but probably by no means to any considerable extent; or to a 
GHJUHH ZKLFK FDQ JLYH DQ\ MXVW JURXQGV IRU VXSSRVLQJ WKDW P\ HVWLPDWH LV WRR ORZ¶135 
Therefore, according to Beeke, although evasion did take place, in no way did it occur to the 
H[WHQWWKDWZRXOGH[SODLQWKHYDULDWLRQEHWZHHQ3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHG\LHOGDQGWKHDFWXDOUHWXUQV
,QVWHDGKHDUJXHVWKLVLVH[SODLQHGE\3LWW¶VLQLWLDOPLVFDOFXODWLRQPHDQLQJWKDWWKHWD[ZDV
never able to produce the revenue that had been promised. 
7KHUHKDVEHHQOLWWOHFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI%HHNH¶VK\SRWKHVLVLQVXEVHTXHQWOLWHUDWXUHDQG
as such limited analysis of the plausibility of his claims.136 It is an arduous task to attempt to 
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assess contemporaneous national income correctly, and even harder to estimate the true amount 
of deductions. It is complicated even further by the secret procedure of the commercial 
commissioners, leaving us unable to comment on to what extent the tax procedure was 
correctly followed. However, there are several IDFWRUVWKDWUHQGHU%HHNH¶VK\SRWKHVLVXQOLNHO\
instead suggesting a culture of widespread commercial evasion. These will be considered in 
turn.  
 
3. Evidence of evasion 
Collecting evidence to support a claim of tax evasion is never straightforward, but it is 
compounded in this case by the secrecy inherent in the assessment of commercial parties and 
the destruction of records. Accordingly, the only evidence that can be adduced is either that 
ZKLFKGLUHFWO\VXSSRUWV3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVDVWRWD[DEOHLQFRPHRUWKat indicates that, regardless 
RIWKHDFFXUDF\RI3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVWKHDFWXDO\LHOGZDVPXFKWRRORZ 
 Perhaps the main evidence of an unduly low commercial contribution is, of course, the 
approximation of liability by Pitt.137 Despite the aforementioned issues with a lack of authority 
for his estimates, some limited support for them can be found in modern studies attempting to 
gauge contemporaneous national income. One such source of support for the approximations 
FDQEHIRXQGLQ'HDQHDQG&ROH¶VHVWLPDWHVDVWRJURVVQDWLRQDOLQFRPH138 According to these 
figures, total income for 1801 amounted to £232 million, of which £94.2 million arose from 
commercial sources7KHVHHVWLPDWHVDUHRIJURVVLQFRPHXQOLNH3LWW¶Vwhich were subject to 
numerous deductions to provide an idea of net taxable income. Despite this, the proportionate 
relationship between national income and commercial-specific income can be used to support 
3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHV$FFRUGLQJ WR'HDQHDQG&ROH¶V Iigures, commercial income accounted for 
around forty-one per cent of overall income, which is in line wiWK3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHRIIRUW\-four 
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per cent. Regardless of the actual figure, the commercial contribution should have amounted 
to between forty and forty-five per cent of the overall yield. It has been established above that 
the actual proportion was just twenty-RQHSHUFHQW7KHUHIRUHLQVXSSRUWLQJ3LWW¶VSURSRUWLRQDWH
HVWLPDWHV 'HDQH DQG &ROH¶V VWXG\ KLJKOLJKWV WKH VLJQLILFDQW XQGHU-contribution by the 
commercial sector.139 
Another way in which conclusions can be drawn regarding the level of commercial 
activity at the time is by considering the value of foreign trade. In 1799 alone, the value of 
imports, exports, and re-exports to and from Great Britain was £62,828,000, rising to 
£73,723,000 in 1800 and £75,098,000 in 1801.140 Although these figures are by no means 
indicators of income (instead accounting for the overall value of foreign trade, which would 
have to be subject to extensive deductions) an important inference can be drawn. Against these 
figures, it is simply implausible to suggest that overall income from commercial activity in 
1799, including purely domestic trade, was only £12 million, as the collection of a mere £1.2 
PLOOLRQVXJJHVWV7KLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\VRLI3LWW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDW%ULWLVKSURILWVRQLPSRUWVDQG
exports amounted to approximately fifteen per cent was correct.141 This would mean that 
taxable income in this area amounted to just over £9 million, indicating that the returns should 
have been £900,000 for foreign trade alone. If this amount was actually returned, it would mean 
that a mere £300,000 was collected from domestic trade, a genre of income estimated by the 
prime minister to produce £28 million per annum. In light of these high values of foreign trade, 
it is sensible to conclude that the tax returns should have been much higher. 
Under-contribution by commercial parties can also be seen when assessing the breakdown 
of the yield by locality.142 Unsurprisingly, the yield in each place is significantly lower than 
expected, for example, less than £990,000 was collected by the commercial commissioners in 
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/RQGRQRIZKLFKXQGHUZDVFROOHFWHGRQLQFRPHIURPWUDGH&RQVLGHULQJ/RQGRQ¶V
status as one of the most important trading cities in the world at that time, this certainly seems 
at odds with what could have been expected. Furthermore, when considering the yield taken 
from localities further afield, and therefore more divorced from central control, it appears that 
even more significant evasion was taking place. For example, the locality with the second 
highest commercial yield, Lancashire, produced a mere £130,000. When considering that this 
amount included commercial revenue from both the entirety of the Lancashire textile industry, 
as well as the significant shipping industry based in Liverpool, the amount collected appears 
far from satisfactory. This pattern is repeated in other significantly industrial-focused localities 
such as Somerset,143 and West Yorkshire.144 Importantly, moreover, this is consistent with what 
is known about the operation of the tax generally in areas that were distant from London, having 
EHHQQRWHGE\HFRQRPLFKLVWRULDQVWKDWµWKHJHRJUDSKLFDOO\UHPRWH¶DYRLGHGWKH tax altogether 
more easily.145  
/DWHUHYHQWVDOVRVXJJHVWWKDW%HHNH¶VDQDO\VLVZDVIODZHG7KHDEROLWLRQRIWKHLQFRPH
tax was made possible by the 1802 treaty of Amiens, but with the outbreak of renewed 
hostilities some 12 months later, new Prime Minister Henry Addington was forced to impose 
another income tax. This second income tax was by all accounts significantly better 
administered, owing not least to the diYLGLQJRILQFRPHEHWZHHQILYHµVFKHGXOHV¶HDFKUHODWLQJ
to a different form of income.146 7KHµVHFUHWSURFHGXUH¶DIIRUGHGWRFRPPHUFLDOLQFRPHZDV
abolished, as was the position of commercial commissioner, and instead commercial income 
was declared to general commissioners.147  
Another important difference between the two taxes was that, at least initially, the rate 
was reduced, making immediate comparisons challenging. However, it is apparent that from 
the beginning the second tax was producing more. The rate in 1803, at one shilling in the pound, 
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or five per cent, was half that of the first tax, yet £1.7 million was collected in gross assessment 
under schedule D, the relevant schedule applying to income from both trade and professions. 
In contrast, the gross assessment made by the commercial commissioners in the 1800 tax year 
was just under £1.6 million, with a mere £1.2 million collected on income from trade.148 This 
demonstrates that, despite the much lower rate, a comparable,149 if not higher, figure was 
collected. By 1806, the rate was once more back up to two shillings in the pound, or ten per 
cent, and the commercial yield for that year grew to £3.46 million, with almost £13 million 
collected overall.150 As such, it seems that both the overall and the commercial yield were not 
only vastly improved upon the first income tax, but also on the £2.8 million suggested by Beeke 
as the maximum that could be collected on commercial income. That in just six years the 
FRPPHUFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHWD[KDGGRXEOHGVLJQLILFDQWO\XQGHUPLQHV%HHNH¶VDUJXPHQW
that the tax was not capable of producing such figures as those estimated by Pitt.  
Although the new schedule D largel\FRUUHODWHGWRWKHµILIWHHQWKFDVH¶RILQFRPHXQGHU
schedule A of the 1799 Act,151 the commercial commissioners during the first tax collected 
only income arising from those involved in trade and manufacture, and not that arising from 
professional men as included under schedule D. As such, it is difficult to make an exact 
comparison between the income collected by the commercial commissioners, and that 
produced under schedule D, owing to the absence of professional income in the former. 
However, if we consider 3LWW¶VHVWLPDWHVDV WR LQFRPHDVVHWRXWDERYHZHFDQVHHWKDWKH
calculated the value of profits from professions to be £2,000,000, suggesting that £200,000 
could be expected in returns.152 It therefore follows that profits from professions simply could 
not have accounted for such a gulf in commercial yield between the taxes. 
The preceding discussion goes a long way towards evidencing that there was a 
significant problem with commercial under-contribution to the first income tax. However, it 
does not necessarily follow from this that evasion was the cause of this under-contribution. In 
the absence of detailed accounts of the first tax, it is impossible to prove that evasion was the 
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definitive reason for the shortfall in the yield from commercial income, and not, for example, 
poor accounting.153 However, given the lax scheme of collection of commercial income 
discussed above, allowing evasion by under-declaration to take place without significant 
difficulty, it seems reasonable to assume that commercial evasion was the principal reason for 
the poor yield. Furthermore, the overwhelming magnitude of the commercial shortfall has been 
demonstrated at length: it is unlikely that poor administration could have occurred to such an 
extent as to explain a shortfall of almost three-quarters on that predicted.154 This conclusion is 
bolstered by contemporary opinion, which indicates that commercial evasion was well-
recognized at the time. Mr Johnes of the House of Commons UHIHUUHG LQ0D\ WR µWKH
&RPPHUFLDO 0HQ ZKR KDG EHHQ JXLOW\ RI D JURVV HYDVLRQ RI WKH WD[¶155 with Mr Tierney 
REVHUYLQJµWKHJURVVHYDVLRQRIWKHPHUFDQWLOHZRUOG¶156 However, the most striking evidence 
comes from an amending bill proposed in April 1800 to remove from the commercial sector 
the benefit of the secret procedure under the commercial commissioners.157 This was never 
passed into law, ostensibly as the influence of the commercial interest was simply too strong,158 
although the fact that it was proposed at all is strongly suggestive that the existence of 
commercial evasion was well-known. Accordingly, it seems that, although there can be no 
conclusive proof that commercial evasion was responsible for the financial failure of the tax, 
the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
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The literature on the first income tax has up to now primarily focused on its administrative 
failings, usually as part of a general study of the history of income taxes in Britain, and any 
references to the role of the commercial sector in its financial failure have been limited and 
lacking in detail. This article thus breaks new ground by showing that, although poor 
administration certainly played a key role in the failure of the first income tax, a significant 
and largely unexplored explanation for its failure was the manner in which commercial income 
ZDVWUHDWHG7KLVDUWLFOHKDVWUDFNHGWKLVLVVXHIURPLWVVRXUFHWKHSROLWLFDOO\SRZHUIXOµVLOHQW
IRUFH¶ of the commercial interest in parliament, to its manifestation in the substance of the tax, 
namely through the secret procedure and commercial-specific tax collectors, up to the ultimate 
financial consequences of the resulting evasion: a shortfall of over forty per cent overall, with 
a commercial shortfall of seventy-three per cent. The responsibility of the commercial 
influence is clear: it is commercial tax evasion that is the key in accounting for the financial 
failure of the first income tax. 
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